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A B S T R A C T 
During the operation of the HiPER first engineering facility, up to 1.2 x 105 MJ/yr of fusión neutrons yields 
are foreseen. This irradiation level could be distributed in 100 MJ detonations, accounting up to 100 deto-
nations in a single burst, with 10 Hz repetition rate. A burst would take place every month. The dose rates 
are computed and different concrete shields are evaluated within the target bay. During the operation of 
the facility the entrance is forbidden inside the bioshield. Between bursts, manual maintenance might be 
performed inside the bioshield but outside the final optics assembly (FOA) shield. Inside the FOA shield 
the residual dose rates are so high that only remote maintenance is allowed. The FOA shield reduces the 
delivered dose rate to optics in a factor of 30.3. 
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
The HiPER phase 4 engineering facility irradiation scenario is not 
still decided.The most demanding one, up to the moment, has been 
thought to consist of 1.2 x 105 MJ of neutrón yield per year. The 
D-T detonations could achieve 100MJ of fusión (14.1 MeV peaked 
distribution) neutrón yield. Distributed in bursts, up to 100 deto-
nations could take place in an only sequence, with a repetition rate 
of 10 Hz. A burst could be performed every month or less. 
This high neutrón yield makes necessary the study of the radi-
ological implications of the operation of the facility. The workers 
are exposed to neutrón and gamma yields. The dose rates are com-
pared to the recommendations given in ICRP74 [1], 20mSv/yr for 
workers (10 |jiSv/h distributed in 8 h of work during 50 weeks). 
The final optics assembly (FOA) is one of the most sensitive parts 
of the facility to the radiation. Even when the shields are designed 
to protect the workers, it is mandatory to compute their effect on 
the dose rate delivered to the FOA for further considerations. 
The design studied in this paper consists of a reaction chamber, 
48 beam tubes, 48 renewable lenses and 48 FOA assemblies of 6 
optical elements each one [2]. To accomplish a correct operation 
of facility, four concrete shields have been added and evaluated in 
different parts of the design. 
During the operation, we have computed the absorbed dose 
rate in the FOA and the ambient dose equivalent (ADE) to workers 
inside the facility. Then, considering the resulting activation of the 
components, we have calculated the ADE delivered to the workers 
between bursts. Dose rates during operation and between bursts 
are computed as independent and they are summed because the 
working plan is not defined and total exposures cannot be com-
puted. 
With this information we have evaluated the different shields 
and made recommendations on the maintenance procedures. If 
necessary, further studies would be carried out on FOA specifically. 
2. Design proposal 
This study is focused on the target bay. It has to be under-
stood as that part of the reactor building where the radiation level 
demands special attention. It is considered to be the rooms inside 
the bioshield. 
2.1. Basic components 
The reaction chamber is the closest component to the detona-
tions. A lOcm thick, 10 m of inner diameter spherical shell, it is 
assumed to be built of stainless steel SS304L [3] because its good 
equilibrium between neutrón activation, thermomechanical prop-
erties and economics. There would be 48 beam penetrations in the 
reaction chamber, distributed into six rings, with the angular dis-
tribution specified in Table 1. There are only three rings described 
since the lower part of the chamber is a specular reflection on the 
plañe z = 0, and rotated 23.36°. The penetrations are 40 cm radius 
rims. Diagnostics penetrations are not considered in this study. 
In order to accomplish the inertial laser-driven fusión D-T reac-
tions, the láser should be entered into the chamber from the láser 
bay. The láser beams are transported inside the beam tubes, where 
Table 1 
Number of rims per ring and angular coordinates of one rim. The rest of the rims are 
distributed uniformly inthe ring. 
N, e,(°) <p¡(.°) 
4 
8 
12 
21.23 
47.03 
74.95 
0.00 
23.36 
29.83 
vacuum is maintained. The beam tubes have a squared section 
of 1 m long side. The tubes wall thickness is 1 cm, and they are 
assumed to be built of SS304L stainless steel. 
The beam tubes host the optical elements, which are built of 
fused silica SÍO2. There are two optical groups. From the center 
of the reaction chamber, the first group is a 48 renewable lenses 
assembly, devoted to focus the beam before entering the reaction 
chamber through the rims. These lenses are 75 cm side squares 
with 5 cm of thickness. This group will get damaged quickly, so it is 
expected to be removed frequently. They are called the renewable 
lenses. 
The second optical group is made up of six different elements 
with its own function (frequency converters, mirrors, and focusing 
lenses). The thick of these elements varíes from 1 to 5 cm. They are 
also 75 cm side squares. This group is called the FOA, and it is a 
very sensitive part of the reactor to be protected from the radiation 
[4,5]. Although this study is not committed to protect this optics, 
the absorbed dose rates are computed in FOA during the operation. 
2.2. Shields 
To protect the facility against radiation and maintain the dose 
limits to workers cióse to the recommendations, several concrete 
shields are added. Those are a prospective proposal for further 
improvements. Concrete has been chosen for being a standard 
shielding material in the presence of neutrons and gammas. 
As may be seen in Fig. 1, there are four types of concrete shields. 
From the center of the reaction chamber, they are the chamber 
shield, the pinhole shield, the FOA shield and the bioshield. 
The reaction chamber shield is a 40 cm thick of borated gunite 
concrete spherical shell, adopted from NIF design [6]. This shield is 
pursued to reduce the dose rate between bursts due to the acti-
vation of the chamber as well as reducing the total amount of 
neutrons, which actívate the whole facility. 
From 15 to 17 m from the center of the reaction chamber, there 
is a spherical shell shield, called the FOA shield. Despite its ñame, it 
has consequences in many aspects: it protects the FOA against high 
doses in operation, helps to reduce the total dose rates delivered 
outside the target bay and reduces the dose rates between bursts 
after it. This shield creates two different áreas inside the target bay 
and allows certain manual maintenance in the external one. 
It has been modeled as a spherical shell because this geometry 
improves the efficiency of the Monte Cario modeling and simula-
tion. In order to explore different thicknesses, it was thought to be 
the best approach. Once the shield thickness is decided according to 
dose limit criteria, this shield will adopt another form, with better 
constructive and structural properties. 
The rims, the beam tubes and the penetrations in FOA shield 
represent a free way for the neutrons to spread out, and in order to 
protect the FOA, there is a cylindrical shield placed inside the beam 
tubes. As the beam travels, it adopts a variable focusing profile. 
Where the beam is focused (mínimum spot size), at 16 m from the 
center of the chamber, the center of this shield is placed, presenting 
a 5 mm radius pinhole to allow the beam to pass through. It is a 
2 m long, 1 m diameter cylinder, which lies in the final optic shield, 
in the transition between one tube and its prolongation after the 
final optic shield. Other materials for the pinhole shield different to 
concrete will be tested in further studies. 
Finally, as high neutrón yields are expected, it has been added a 
2 m thick bioshield at 25 m from the center of the reaction chamber. 
Its aim is to definitely sepárate the target bay from the rest of the 
facility. 
Inside the target bay there are two different rooms, called área 
1 and área 2; (see Fig. 1) the two first meters of air outside the 
bioshield, i.e., the exterior of the target bay, are referred as the área 
3. 
The composition of no-borated concrete assumed in this study 
for the FOA shield, pinhole shield and bioshield is taken from [7]. 
3. Methodology and assumptions 
3.1. Methodology 
To perform this study we have used the following methodol-
ogy. The first step has been to design the geometry of the facility 
using MCAM [8] code. This is a tool conceived to draw and transíate 
complex geometries into Monte Cario transport codes. 
Once the geometry was decided [2], with MCAM it was gen-
erated an input file valid for MCNPX [9] transport code. The 
resulting neutrons transport from the detonations was performed 
with MCNPX and cross-section libraries lal 50n, endf60 and endl92, 
depending on the availability for every isotope. The absorbed dose 
rate in the FOA was calculated directly with MCNPX. With the 
flux-to-dose conversión coefficients [10] for ambient dose equiva-
lent, the dose rates to workers were calculated. Extended vitamin-J 
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Fig. 1. HiPER design to study neutronics and activation, performed with MCAM. Fig. 2. Scheme of computational methodology. 
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Fig. 3. Residual dose rate in the three different áreas afterthe lst and the 239th burst. The red line stands for the hands-on maintenance, 10 |xSv/h. (For interpretation of the 
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web versión of the article.) 
group structure neutrón fluxes in every component of the facility 
were extracted to compute the resulting activation. 
With ACAB code [ 11 ] and the EAF activation libraries [ 12], it was 
then computed the activation derived from the exact pulsed regime 
ofthe reactor for every component ofthe facility. With MCNPXthe 
resulting decay gammas were transported through the target bay 
and the residual dose rates were computed, again with the ICRP 
coefficients. 
3.2. Assumptions 
The source neutrons have been assumed to born according to a 
direct drive inertial fusión detonation spectrum [13]. 
With regards to ADE to workers during the operation, there is 
no preferred position inside the target bay, as long as there is no 
foreseen mandatory presence of workers. So it makes no sense mea-
suring specific places, and the average gives a reasonable estímate. 
Thus, the ADE to workers is averaged over any ofthe three possible 
áreas ofthe facility (see Fig. 1). 
Concerning with the dose rates between bursts, as there is no 
specific procedure for the maintenance up to now, the general idea 
of what happens in every área is given by the average ADE in that 
área. 
Outside the target bay, the ADE is averaged in the first 2 m of air, 
representing the closest position of a person to the bioshield. 
It has to be kept in mind that the average dose rates represent 
no more than estimates. In order to compute the accurate dose rate 
received by the workers it is necessary to know the whole activity, 
the place where it is carried out and its duration. 
The absorbed dose rate to the FOA has been averaged in the 
whole group of lenses in order to increase the efficiency ofthe sim-
ulations. So, the results are average dose in all the lenses. When 
further decisions were made on the design, a more precise calcula-
tion will be carried out in every single component (Fig. 2). 
With regards to the composition of the different materials, 
reasonable concentrations of impurities have been assumed for 
SS304L [3] and concretes [6,7]. The SÍO2 has been considered to be 
puré. 
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Fig. 4. Contribution of different components to the residual dose rate in área 1. 
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4. Results and analyses 
The presence of the FOA shield affects dramatically to the 
absorbed dose rate in this group of lenses during operation. We 
have computed the absorbed dose rate in the FOA every year con-
sidering the absence and presence of the FOA shield, being present 
in both cases the pinhole shield. 
The results, in Table 2 show that this shield reduces in a factor of 
30.3 the total dose delivered to these components. If those levéis of 
irradiation result to be unacceptable in the FOA, further protection 
will be added. 
The ADEs to workers (Table 3) indícate that entrance is not 
allowed área 1 and área 2 during the operation of the reactor. The 
exterior of the target bay fulfills the conditioning of representing a 
dose rate below the limit to workers. 
The high radiation level present inside área 1, and even in área 
2, makes necessary to carefully design and protect the electronics 
which could be present in these áreas during the operation of the 
reactor. 
The time evolution between bursts of the ADE to workers is 
depicted in Fig. 3. The cumulative effect of long-live radioisotopes 
makes the residual dose rate to increase in up to a factor of 4 
between the first and the last burst. 
The contributions between bursts of every activated compo-
nent to the total ADE to workers in áreas 1 and 2 are depicted in 
Figs. 4 and 5. The residual dose rate in área 3 is exclusively due to 
the activation of the bioshield. 
The entrance in área 1 is forbidden also between bursts. There 
are several activated components, which represent an ADE much 
higher than 10 |jiSv/h during the whole month. Thus, in case that 
maintenance was necessary, robotics would be essential. From 1 h 
after the shutdown to the next burst, the main contributors to the 
dose rate are the beam tubes, the optical shield and the rims. How-
ever, due to the high dose rate, it is not worthwhile to try to reduce 
it. 
It is not the case for the área 2. Around 36 h after the first burst, 
the ADE falls below the 10|jiSv/h limit, and workers could enter 
8h per day. However, two facts must be kept in mind. The first 
one is that the average dose is an estímate, and in order to make 
decisions on the maintenance, it is necessary to know the activity 
to be carried out, the position, and the exposure time. The second 
fact is that even when workers could not stand inside the área 2 for 
8 h per day, as bursts happen, collective dose planning could allow 
manual maintenance. 
Another alternative is to act on the second beam tubes, as 
they are the main responsible for this dose rate after some 
minutes. Different strategies are: to shield the tubes against neu-
trons, to shield the workers against the gamma that they emit 
or choosing another material with lower activation at these time 
scales. 
The área 3 is below the recommend limit for the public 
and the workers, so, it stands for the exterior of the target 
bay. 
Table 2 
Prompt dose rate delivered to the FOA considering the absence and presence of the 
final optic shield. 
Neutrons 
Gamma 
Total 
Table 3 
Prompt dose 
No-shield (Gy/yr) Shielded (Gy/yr) 
571 34.1 
891 14.2 
1460 48.2 
rates to workers averaged in áreas 1, 2 and 3. 
Área 1 (Sv/yr) Área 2 (Sv/yr) 
Relation 
16.7 
62.7 
30.3 
Área 3 (Sv/yr) 
Neutrons 
Gamma 
Total 
3.46 x 105 
8.70 x 103 
3.55 x 105 
32.9 
0.63 
32.6 
1.69x10 
1.88x10 
2.05 x 10 
5. Conclusions 
The shielding requirements for a preliminary HiPER design have 
been analyzed. 
The absorbed dose rate during operation in the FOA reaches 
valúes of 1460 Sv/yr in the absence of FOA shield. The FOA 
shield reduces this quantity to 48.2 Sv/yr, a reduction of a factor 
30.3. 
During the operation, workers are not allowed to enter in áreas 
1 and 2, while the área 3 fulfills the recommendations to workers 
regarding with dose rates. 
Maintenance inside área 1 must be strictly remote. Inside the 
área 2, it is expected manual maintenance after some considera-
tions, planning and likely modifications of the design. In área 3, 
manual maintenance is recommended. 
Acknowledgements References 
This work has been performed for HiPER: European High 
Power Láser Energy Research Facility (Preparatory Phase Study). 
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the funding 
agencies in undertaking this work (EC FP7 project num-
ber 211737): EC, European Commission, MSMT, Ministry of 
Education, Youth and Sports of the Czech Republic and 
STFC, Science and Technology Facilities Council of the United 
Kingdom. 
The authors thank to Bruno Le Garree from CEA for providing 
the information of the preliminary design of the HiPER reactor and 
helpful and fluid communication during the development of this 
study. 
[11 ICRP publication, 74,1996. 
[2] B. Le Garree, Prívate communication, 2010. 
[3] J. Sanz, O. Cabellos, S. Reyes, Fusión Eng. Des. 75-79 (2005) 1157-1161. 
[4] J.F. Latkowski, A. Kubota, MJ. Caturla, S.N. Dixit, J.A. Speth, et al., Fusión Sci. 
Technol. 43 (2003). 
[5[ C.D. Marshall, J.A. Speth, S.A. Payne, J. Non-Cryst. Solids 212 (1997) 59-73. 
[6[ J.F. Latkowski, Fusión Technol. 39 (2001) 956-959. 
[7[ J.F. Latkowski, J. Sanz, UCRL-JC-133680,1999. 
[8[ Y. Wu, FDS Team, Fusión Eng. Des. 84 (2009) 1987-1992. 
[9[ D.B. Pelowitz, MCNPX User's Manual, LA-CP-05-0369 (2005) and extensions. 
[10[ ICRP publication 60, Ana ICRP 21 (1990) 1-3. 
[ 11 [ J. Sanz, et al., ACAB User's Manual v.2008. NEA-1839. 
[12[ R-A. Forrest, EAF-2007 transport libraries, UKAEAFUS 538, 2007. 
[13] J. Perkins, Prívate communication. 
